--- old/usr/src/cmd/ssh/sshd/auth.c	Tue Aug 16 19:27:16 2016
+++ /dev/null	Tue Aug 16 19:26:53 2016
@@ -1,794 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-/*
- * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
- * Use is subject to license terms.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.45 2002/09/20 18:41:29 stevesk Exp $");
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
-#include <login.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-#include <shadow.h>
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
-#include <libgen.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "groupaccess.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "tildexpand.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_BSM
-#include "bsmaudit.h"
-#include <bsm/adt.h>
-#endif /* HAVE_BSM */
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/* Debugging messages */
-Buffer auth_debug;
-int auth_debug_init;
-
-/*
- * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
- * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
- * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
- * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
- * listed there, false will be returned.
- * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
- * Otherwise true is returned.
- */
-int
-allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
-{
-	struct stat st;
-	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
-	char *shell;
-	int i;
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-	char *loginmsg;
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
-#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
-	!defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
-	struct spwd *spw;
-
-	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
-	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
-		return 0;
-
-#define	DAY		(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
-	spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
-	if (spw != NULL) {
-		time_t today = time(NULL) / DAY;
-		debug3("allowed_user: today %d sp_expire %d sp_lstchg %d"
-		    " sp_max %d", (int)today, (int)spw->sp_expire,
-		    (int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max);
-
-		/*
-		 * We assume account and password expiration occurs the
-		 * day after the day specified.
-		 */
-		if (spw->sp_expire != -1 && today > spw->sp_expire) {
-			log("Account %.100s has expired", pw->pw_name);
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-		if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) {
-			log("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)",
-			    pw->pw_name);
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-		if (spw->sp_max != -1 &&
-		    today > spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max) {
-			log("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)",
-			    pw->pw_name);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-#else
-	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
-	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
-		return 0;
-#endif
-
-	/*
-	 * Get the shell from the password data.  An empty shell field is
-	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
-	 */
-	shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
-
-	/* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
-	if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
-		log("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
-		    pw->pw_name, shell);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
-	    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
-		log("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
-		    pw->pw_name, shell);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) {
-		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping);
-		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
-	}
-
-	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
-	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
-			    options.deny_users[i])) {
-				log("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
-				    pw->pw_name);
-				return 0;
-			}
-	}
-	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
-	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
-		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
-			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
-			    options.allow_users[i]))
-				break;
-		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
-		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
-			log("User %.100s not allowed because not listed in AllowUsers",
-			    pw->pw_name);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
-		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
-		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
-			log("User %.100s not allowed because not in any group",
-			    pw->pw_name);
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-		/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
-		if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
-			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
-			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
-				ga_free();
-				log("User %.100s not allowed because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
-				    pw->pw_name);
-				return 0;
-			}
-		/*
-		 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
-		 * isn't listed there
-		 */
-		if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
-			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
-			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
-				ga_free();
-				log("User %.100s not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups",
-				    pw->pw_name);
-				return 0;
-			}
-		ga_free();
-	}
-
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-	if (loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &loginmsg) != 0) {
-		if (loginmsg && *loginmsg) {
-			/* Remove embedded newlines (if any) */
-			char *p;
-			for (p = loginmsg; *p; p++) {
-				if (*p == '\n')
-					*p = ' ';
-			}
-			/* Remove trailing newline */
-			*--p = '\0';
-			log("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, loginmsg);
-		}
-		return 0;
-	}
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
-
-	/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
-	return 1;
-}
-
-Authctxt *
-authctxt_new(void)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
-	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
-	return authctxt;
-}
-
-void
-auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
-{
-	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
-	char *authmsg, *user_str;
-
-	if (authctxt == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: INTERNAL ERROR", __func__);
-
-	/* Raise logging level */
-	if (authenticated == 1 || !authctxt->valid)
-		authlog = log;
-	else if (authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG ||
-	    authctxt->attempt >= options.max_auth_tries_log ||
-	    authctxt->init_attempt >= options.max_init_auth_tries_log)
-		authlog = notice;
-
-	if (authctxt->method) {
-		authmsg = "Failed";
-		if (authctxt->method->postponed)
-			authmsg = "Postponed"; /* shouldn't happen */
-		if (authctxt->method->abandoned)
-			authmsg = "Abandoned";
-		if (authctxt->method->authenticated) {
-			if (userauth_check_partial_failure(authctxt))
-				authmsg = "Partially accepted";
-			else
-				authmsg = "Accepted";
-		}
-		else
-			authmsg = "Failed";
-	}
-	else {
-		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
-	}
-
-	if (authctxt->user == NULL || *authctxt->user == '\0')
-		user_str = "<implicit>";
-	else if (!authctxt->valid)
-		user_str =  "<invalid username>";
-	else
-		user_str =  authctxt->user;
-
-	authlog("%s %s for %s from %.200s port %d%s",
-	    authmsg,
-	    (method != NULL) ? method : "<unknown authentication method>",
-	    user_str,
-	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
-	    get_remote_port(),
-	    info);
-
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-	if (authenticated == 0 && strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
-	    loginfailed(authctxt->user,
-		get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping),
-		"ssh");
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
-
-}
-
-#ifdef HAVE_BSM
-void
-audit_failed_login_cleanup(void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ctxt;
-	adt_session_data_t *ah;
-
-	/*
-	 * This table lists the different variable combinations evaluated and
-	 * what the resulting PAM return value is.  As the table shows
-	 * authctxt and authctxt->valid need to be checked before either of
-	 * the authctxt->pam* variables.
-	 *
-	 *           authctxt->                     authctxt->     
-	 * authctxt    valid      authctxt->pam       pam_retval   PAM rval
-	 * --------  ----------   -------------     ------------   --------
-	 *   NULL      ANY             ANY              ANY        PAM_ABORT
-	 *    OK      zero (0)         ANY              ANY     PAM_USER_UNKNOWN
-	 *    OK       one (1)         NULL         PAM_SUCCESS  PAM_PERM_DENIED
-	 *    OK       one (1)         NULL        !PAM_SUCCESS   authctxt->
-	 *                                                          pam_retval
-	 *    OK       one (1)         VALID            ANY       authctxt->
-	 *                                                        pam_retval (+)
-	 * (+) If not set then default to PAM_PERM_DENIED
-	 */
-
-	if (authctxt == NULL) {
-		/* Internal error */
-		audit_sshd_login_failure(&ah, PAM_ABORT, NULL);
-		return;
-	}
-
-	if (authctxt->valid == 0) {
-		audit_sshd_login_failure(&ah, PAM_USER_UNKNOWN, NULL);
-	} else if (authctxt->pam == NULL) {
-		if (authctxt->pam_retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
-			audit_sshd_login_failure(&ah, PAM_PERM_DENIED,
-			    authctxt->user);
-		} else {
-			audit_sshd_login_failure(&ah, authctxt->pam_retval,
-			    authctxt->user);
-		}
-	} else {
-		audit_sshd_login_failure(&ah, AUTHPAM_ERROR(authctxt,
-		    PAM_PERM_DENIED), authctxt->user);
-	}
-}
-#endif /* HAVE_BSM */
-
-/*
- * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
- */
-int
-auth_root_allowed(char *method)
-{
-	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
-	case PERMIT_YES:
-		return 1;
-		break;
-	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
-		if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0 &&
-		    strcmp(method, "keyboard-interactive") != 0)
-			return 1;
-		break;
-	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
-		if (forced_command) {
-			log("Root login accepted for forced command.");
-			return 1;
-		}
-		break;
-	}
-	log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
-	return 0;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
- * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
- * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
- *
- * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
- */
-char *
-expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
-{
-	Buffer buffer;
-	char *file;
-	const char *cp;
-
-	if (pw == 0)
-		return NULL; /* shouldn't happen */
-	/*
-	 * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate
-	 * substitutions to the given file name.
-	 */
-	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) {
-		if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
-			buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1);
-			cp++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
-			buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
-			cp++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
-			buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
-			    strlen(pw->pw_name));
-			cp++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1);
-	}
-	buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
-
-	/*
-	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
-	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
-	 */
-	file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer);
-	if (*cp != '/')
-		snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp);
-	else
-		strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN);
-
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
-	return file;
-}
-
-char *
-authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
-{
-	return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
-}
-
-char *
-authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
-{
-	return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
-}
-
-/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
-HostStatus
-check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
-    const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
-{
-	Key *found;
-	char *user_hostfile;
-	struct stat st;
-	HostStatus host_status;
-
-	/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
-	found = key_new(key->type);
-	host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
-
-	if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
-		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
-		if (options.strict_modes &&
-		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
-		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
-			log("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
-			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
-			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
-		} else {
-			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-			host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
-			    host, key, found, NULL);
-			restore_uid();
-		}
-		xfree(user_hostfile);
-	}
-	key_free(found);
-
-	debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
-	    "ok" : "not found", host);
-	return host_status;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
- * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
- * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
- *
- * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
- *
- * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
- * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
- */
-int
-secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
-    char *err, size_t errlen)
-{
-	uid_t uid;
-	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
-	char *cp;
-	int comparehome = 0;
-	struct stat st;
-
-	if (pw == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	uid = pw->pw_uid;
-
-	if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
-		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
-		    strerror(errno));
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * A user is not required to have all the files that are subject to
-	 * the strict mode checking in his/her home directory. If the
-	 * directory is not present at the moment, which might be the case if
-	 * the directory is not mounted until the user is authenticated, do
-	 * not perform the home directory check below.
-	 */
-	if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
-		comparehome = 1;
-
-	/* check the open file to avoid races */
-	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
-	    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
-	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
-		    buf);
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
-	for (;;) {
-		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
-			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
-			return -1;
-		}
-		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
-
-		debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
-		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
-		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
-		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-			snprintf(err, errlen,
-			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
-			return -1;
-		}
-
-		/* If we passed the homedir then we can stop. */
-		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
-			debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
-			    buf);
-			break;
-		}
-		/*
-		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
-		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
-		 */
-		if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
-			break;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-struct passwd *
-getpwnamallow(const char *user)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-	extern login_cap_t *lc;
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	auth_session_t *as;
-#endif
-#endif
-	struct passwd *pw;
-
-	if (user == NULL || *user == '\0')
-		return (NULL); /* implicit user, will be set later */
-
-	parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
-	    get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping), get_remote_ipaddr());
-
-	pw = getpwnam(user);
-	if (pw == NULL) {
-		log("Illegal user %.100s from %.100s",
-		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-	if (!allowed_user(pw))
-		return (NULL);
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-	if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
-		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
-		return (NULL);
-	}
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
-	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
-		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
-		pw = NULL;
-	}
-	if (as != NULL)
-		auth_close(as);
-#endif
-#endif
-	if (pw != NULL)
-		return (pwcopy(pw));
-	return (NULL);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * The fatal_cleanup method to kill the hook. Since hook has been put into
- * new process group all descendants will be killed as well.
- */
-static void
-kill_hook(void *arg)
-{
-	pid_t pid;
-
-        pid = *(pid_t*)arg;
-	debug("killing hook and all it's children, process group: %ld", pid);
-	xfree(arg);
-	(void)killpg(pid, SIGTERM);
-}
-
-/*
- * Runs the PreUserauthHook.
- * Returns -1 on execution error or the exit code of the hook if execution is
- * successful.
- */
-int
-run_auth_hook(const char *path, const char *user, const char *method)
-{
-	struct stat st;
-	int i, status, ret = 1;
-	u_int envsize, argsize;
-	char buf[256];
-	char **env, **args;
-        pid_t pid, *ppid;
-
-	if (path == NULL || user == NULL || method == NULL) {
-		return (-1);
-	}
-
-	/* Initialize the environment/arguments for the hook. */
-	envsize = 4; /* 3 env vars + EndOfList marker */
-	argsize = 4; /* 2 args + exe name + EndOfList marker */
-	env = xmalloc(envsize * sizeof (char *));
-	args = xmalloc(argsize * sizeof (char *));
-	env[0] = NULL;
-
-	/* we use the SSH env handling scheme */
-	child_set_env_silent(&env, &envsize, "PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin");
-	child_set_env_silent(&env, &envsize, "IFS", " \t\n");
-
-	(void) snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf), "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
-	    get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(),
-	    get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()), get_local_port());
-	child_set_env_silent(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
-
-	args[0] = xstrdup(path);
-	args[1] = xstrdup(method);
-	args[2] = xstrdup(user);
-	args[3] = NULL;
-
-	/*
-	 * sanity checks
-	 * note: the checks do not make sure that the file checked is actually
-	 * the same which is executed. However, in this case it shouldn't be a
-	 * major issue since the hook is rather static and the worst case would
-	 * be an uncorrect message in the log or a hook is run even though the
-	 * permissions are not right.
-	 */
-
-	/* check if script does exist */
-	if (stat(path, &st) < 0) {
-		log("Error executing PreUserauthHook \"%s\": %s", path,
-		    strerror(errno));
-		goto cleanup;
-	}
-
-	/* Check correct permissions for script (uid of SSHD, mode 500) */
-	if (st.st_uid != getuid() || ((st.st_mode & 0777) != 0500)) {
-		log("PreUserauthHook has invalid permissions (should be 500, is"
-		    " %o) or ownership (should be %d, is %d)",
-		(uint) st.st_mode & 0777, getuid(), st.st_uid);
-		goto cleanup;
-	}
-
-	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
-		/* 
-		 * We put the hook and all its (possible) descendants into
-		 * a new process group so that in case of a hanging hook
-		 * we can wipe out the whole "family".
-		 */
-            	if (setpgid(0, 0) != 0) {
-			log("setpgid: %s", strerror(errno));
-			_exit(255);
-                }
-		(void) execve(path, args, env);
-		/* child is gone so we shouldn't get here */
-		log("Error executing PreUserauthHook \"%s\": %s", path,
-		    strerror(errno));
-		_exit(255);
-	} else if (pid == -1) {
-		log("Error executing PreUserauthHook \"%s\": %s", path,
-		    strerror(errno));
-		goto cleanup;
-	}
-
-	/* make preparations to kill hook if it is hanging */
-	ppid = xmalloc(sizeof (pid_t));
-	*ppid = pid;
-	fatal_add_cleanup((void (*)(void *))kill_hook, (void *) ppid);
-
-	if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-		log("Error executing PreUserauthHook \"%s\": %s", path,
-		    strerror(errno));
-		goto cleanup;
-	}
-
-	ret = WEXITSTATUS(status);
-
-	if (ret == 255) {
-		ret = -1; /* execve() failed, error msg already logged */
-	} else if (ret != 0) {
-		log("PreUserauthHook \"%s\" failed with exit code %d",
-		    path, ret);
-	} else {
-		debug("PreUserauthHook \"%s\" finished successfully", path);
-	}
-
-cleanup:
-	for (i = 0; args[i] != NULL; i++) {
-		xfree(args[i]);
-	}
-	for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) {
-		xfree(env[i]);
-	}
-	xfree(args);
-	xfree(env);
-
-	fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*)(void *))kill_hook, (void *) ppid);
-
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
-{
-	char buf[1024];
-	va_list args;
-
-	if (!auth_debug_init)
-		return;
-
-	va_start(args, fmt);
-	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
-	va_end(args);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_send(void)
-{
-	char *msg;
-
-	if (!auth_debug_init)
-		return;
-	while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
-		msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
-		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
-		xfree(msg);
-	}
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_reset(void)
-{
-	if (auth_debug_init)
-		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
-	else {
-		buffer_init(&auth_debug);
-		auth_debug_init = 1;
-	}
-}
