--- old/usr/src/cmd/ssh/libssh/common/packet.c	Tue Aug 16 19:27:14 2016
+++ /dev/null	Tue Aug 16 19:26:53 2016
@@ -1,1845 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
- * with the other side.  This same code is used both on client and server side.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- *
- *
- * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
- * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-/*
- * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
- * Use is subject to license terms.
- */
-
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.148 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include "sys-queue.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "crc32.h"
-#include "getput.h"
-#include "compress.h"
-#include "deattack.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "mac.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "engine.h"
-
-/* PKCS#11 engine */
-ENGINE *e;
-
-#ifdef ALTPRIVSEP
-static int packet_server = 0;
-static int packet_monitor = 0;
-#endif /* ALTPRIVSEP */
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-#define DBG(x) x
-#else
-#define DBG(x)
-#endif
-
-static void packet_send2(void);
-
-/*
- * This variable contains the file descriptors used for communicating with
- * the other side.  connection_in is used for reading; connection_out for
- * writing.  These can be the same descriptor, in which case it is assumed to
- * be a socket.
- */
-static int connection_in = -1;
-static int connection_out = -1;
-
-/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
-static u_int remote_protocol_flags = 0;
-
-/* Encryption context for receiving data.  This is only used for decryption. */
-static CipherContext receive_context;
-
-/* Encryption context for sending data.  This is only used for encryption. */
-static CipherContext send_context;
-
-/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
-Buffer input;
-
-/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
-Buffer output;
-
-/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
-static Buffer outgoing_packet;
-
-/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
-static Buffer incoming_packet;
-
-/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
-static Buffer compression_buffer;
-static int compression_buffer_ready = 0;
-
-/* Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is enabled. */
-static int packet_compression = 0;
-
-/* default maximum packet size */
-int max_packet_size = 32768;
-
-/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
-static int initialized = 0;
-
-/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
-static int interactive_mode = 0;
-
-/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
-Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
-static struct packet_state {
-	u_int32_t seqnr;
-	u_int32_t packets;
-	u_int64_t blocks;
-} p_read, p_send;
-
-static u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out;
-static u_int32_t rekey_limit;
-
-/* Session key for protocol v1 */
-static u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
-static u_int ssh1_keylen;
-
-/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
-static u_char extra_pad = 0;
-
-struct packet {
-	TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
-	u_char type;
-	Buffer payload;
-};
-TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
-
-/*
- * Part of what -f option and ~& escape sequence do in the client is that they
- * will force it to daemonize itself. Due to the fork safety rules inherent in
- * any PKCS#11 environment, if the engine is used we must do a key re-exchange
- * before forking a child to negotiate the new keys. Those keys will be used to
- * inicialize the new crypto contexts. This involves finishing the engine in the
- * parent and reinitializing it again in both processes after fork() returns.
- * This approach also leaves protocol 1 out since it doesn't support rekeying.
- */
-int will_daemonize;
-
-#ifdef	PACKET_DEBUG
-/* This function dumps data onto stderr. This is for debugging only. */
-void
-data_dump(void *data, u_int len)
-{
-	Buffer buf;
-
-	buffer_init(&buf);
-	buffer_append(&buf, data, len);
-	buffer_dump(&buf);
-	buffer_free(&buf);
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Sets the descriptors used for communication.  Disables encryption until
- * packet_set_encryption_key is called.
- */
-void
-packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
-{
-	Cipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
-
-	if (none == NULL)
-		fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'");
-	connection_in = fd_in;
-	connection_out = fd_out;
-	cipher_init(&send_context, none, (unsigned char *) "", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
-	cipher_init(&receive_context, none, (unsigned char *) "", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
-	newkeys[MODE_IN] = newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
-	if (!initialized) {
-		initialized = 1;
-		buffer_init(&input);
-		buffer_init(&output);
-		buffer_init(&outgoing_packet);
-		buffer_init(&incoming_packet);
-		TAILQ_INIT(&outgoing);
-	} else {
-		buffer_clear(&input);
-		buffer_clear(&output);
-		buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
-		buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Prime the cache for get_remote_ipaddr() while we have a
-	 * socket on which to do a getpeername().
-	 */
-	(void) get_remote_ipaddr();
-
-	/* Kludge: arrange the close function to be called from fatal(). */
-	fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL);
-}
-
-/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
-
-int
-packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
-{
-	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
-	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
-
-	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
-	if (connection_in != -1 && connection_in == connection_out)
-		return 1;
-	fromlen = sizeof(from);
-	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
-	if (getpeername(connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0)
-		return 0;
-	tolen = sizeof(to);
-	memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
-	if (getpeername(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0)
-		return 0;
-	if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
-		return 0;
-	if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
-		return 0;
-	return 1;
-}
-
-/* returns 1 if connection is via ipv4 */
-
-int
-packet_connection_is_ipv4(void)
-{
-	struct sockaddr_storage to;
-	socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
-
-	memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
-	if (getsockname(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0)
-		return 0;
-	if (to.ss_family == AF_INET)
-		return 1;
-#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
-	if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 && 
-	    IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
-		return 1;
-#endif
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
-
-void
-packet_set_nonblocking(void)
-{
-	/* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
-	if (fcntl(connection_in, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
-		error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
-	if (connection_out != connection_in) {
-		if (fcntl(connection_out, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
-			error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-	}
-}
-
-/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
-
-int
-packet_get_connection_in(void)
-{
-	return connection_in;
-}
-
-/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
-
-int
-packet_get_connection_out(void)
-{
-	return connection_out;
-}
-
-/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
-
-void
-packet_close(void)
-{
-	if (!initialized)
-		return;
-	initialized = 0;
-	if (connection_in == connection_out) {
-		shutdown(connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
-		close(connection_out);
-	} else {
-		close(connection_in);
-		close(connection_out);
-	}
-	buffer_free(&input);
-	buffer_free(&output);
-	buffer_free(&outgoing_packet);
-	buffer_free(&incoming_packet);
-	if (compression_buffer_ready) {
-		buffer_free(&compression_buffer);
-		buffer_compress_uninit();
-		compression_buffer_ready = 0;
-	}
-	cipher_cleanup(&send_context);
-	cipher_cleanup(&receive_context);
-}
-
-/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
-
-void
-packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
-{
-	remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
-}
-
-/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
-
-u_int
-packet_get_protocol_flags(void)
-{
-	return remote_protocol_flags;
-}
-
-/*
- * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
- * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
- */
-
-static void
-packet_init_compression(void)
-{
-	if (compression_buffer_ready == 1)
-		return;
-	compression_buffer_ready = 1;
-	buffer_init(&compression_buffer);
-}
-
-void
-packet_start_compression(int level)
-{
-#ifdef ALTPRIVSEP
-	/* shouldn't happen! */
-	if (packet_monitor)
-		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: The monitor cannot compress.");
-#endif /* ALTPRIVSEP */
-
-	if (packet_compression && !compat20)
-		fatal("Compression already enabled.");
-	packet_compression = 1;
-	packet_init_compression();
-	buffer_compress_init_send(level);
-	buffer_compress_init_recv();
-}
-
-/*
- * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key.  The same
- * key is used for both sending and reception.  However, both directions are
- * encrypted independently of each other.
- */
-
-void
-packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen,
-    int number)
-{
-	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
-
-	if (cipher == NULL)
-		fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: unknown cipher number %d", number);
-	if (keylen < 20)
-		fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too small: %d", keylen);
-	if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH)
-		fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too big: %d", keylen);
-	memcpy(ssh1_key, key, keylen);
-	ssh1_keylen = keylen;
-	cipher_init(&send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
-	cipher_init(&receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
-}
-
-u_int
-packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *key)
-{
-	if (key == NULL)
-		return (ssh1_keylen);
-	memcpy(key, ssh1_key, ssh1_keylen);
-	return (ssh1_keylen);
-}
-
-/* Start constructing a packet to send. */
-void
-packet_start(u_char type)
-{
-	u_char buf[9];
-	int len;
-
-	DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
-	len = compat20 ? 6 : 9;
-	memset(buf, 0, len - 1);
-	buf[len - 1] = type;
-	buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
-	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
-}
-
-/* Append payload. */
-void
-packet_put_char(int value)
-{
-	char ch = value;
-
-	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_int(u_int value)
-{
-	buffer_put_int(&outgoing_packet, value);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len)
-{
-	buffer_put_string(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_cstring(const char *str)
-{
-	buffer_put_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_utf8_cstring(const char *str)
-{
-	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_STRING_ENCODING)
-		buffer_put_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str);
-	else
-		buffer_put_utf8_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_utf8_string(const char *str, uint_t len)
-{
-	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_STRING_ENCODING)
-		buffer_put_string(&outgoing_packet, str, len);
-	else
-		buffer_put_utf8_string(&outgoing_packet, str, len);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
-{
-	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
-{
-	buffer_put_bignum(&outgoing_packet, value);
-}
-
-void
-packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
-{
-	buffer_put_bignum2(&outgoing_packet, value);
-}
-
-/*
- * Finalizes and sends the packet.  If the encryption key has been set,
- * encrypts the packet before sending.
- */
-
-static void
-packet_send1(void)
-{
-	u_char buf[8], *cp;
-	int i, padding, len;
-	u_int checksum;
-	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
-	 * packet.
-	 */
-	if (packet_compression) {
-		buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
-		/* Skip padding. */
-		buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8);
-		/* padding */
-		buffer_append(&compression_buffer, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8);
-		buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer);
-		buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
-		buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
-		    buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
-	}
-	/* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */
-	len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
-
-	/* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */
-	padding = 8 - len % 8;
-	if (!send_context.plaintext) {
-		cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
-		for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
-			if (i % 4 == 0)
-				rnd = arc4random();
-			cp[7 - i] = rnd & 0xff;
-			rnd >>= 8;
-		}
-	}
-	buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8 - padding);
-
-	/* Add check bytes. */
-	checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-	PUT_32BIT(buf, checksum);
-	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-	fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: ");
-	buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet);
-#endif
-
-	/* Append to output. */
-	PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
-	buffer_append(&output, buf, 4);
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-	cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-	debug("encrypted output queue now contains (%d bytes):\n",
-	    buffer_len(&output));
-	buffer_dump(&output);
-#endif
-
-	buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
-
-	/*
-	 * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output.  It won\'t be
-	 * actually sent until packet_write_wait or packet_write_poll is
-	 * called.
-	 */
-}
-
-void
-set_newkeys(int mode)
-{
-	Enc *enc;
-	Mac *mac;
-	Comp *comp;
-	CipherContext *cc;
-	u_int64_t *max_blocks;
-	int crypt_type;
-
-	debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
-
-	if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
-		cc = &send_context;
-		crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
-		p_send.packets = p_send.blocks = 0;
-		max_blocks = &max_blocks_out;
-	} else {
-		cc = &receive_context;
-		crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
-		p_read.packets = p_read.blocks = 0;
-		max_blocks = &max_blocks_in;
-	}
-
-	debug("set_newkeys: setting new keys for '%s' mode",
-	    mode == MODE_IN ? "in" : "out");
-
-	if (newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
-		cipher_cleanup(cc);
-		free_keys(newkeys[mode]);
-	}
-
-	newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
-	if (newkeys[mode] == NULL)
-		fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode);
-	enc  = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
-	mac  = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
-	comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
-	if (mac_init(mac) == 0)
-		mac->enabled = 1;
-#ifdef	PACKET_DEBUG
-	debug("new encryption key:\n");
-	data_dump(enc->key, enc->key_len);
-	debug("new encryption IV:\n");
-	data_dump(enc->iv, enc->block_size);
-	debug("new MAC key:\n");
-	data_dump(mac->key, mac->key_len);
-#endif
-	cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
-	    enc->iv, enc->block_size, crypt_type);
-	/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
-	/* memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
-	   memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); */
-	if (comp->type != 0 && comp->enabled == 0) {
-		packet_init_compression();
-		if (mode == MODE_OUT)
-			buffer_compress_init_send(6);
-		else
-			buffer_compress_init_recv();
-		comp->enabled = 1;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * In accordance to the RFCs listed below we enforce the key
-	 * re-exchange for:
-	 * 
-	 * - every 1GB of transmitted data if the selected cipher block size
-	 *   is less than 16 bytes (3DES, Blowfish)
-	 * - every 2^(2*B) cipher blocks transmitted (B is block size in bytes)
-	 *   if the cipher block size is greater than or equal to 16 bytes (AES)
-	 * - and we never send more than 2^32 SSH packets using the same keys.
-	 *   The recommendation of 2^31 packets is not enforced here but in
-	 *   packet_need_rekeying(). There is also a hard check in
-	 *   packet_send2_wrapped() that we don't send more than 2^32 packets.
-	 *
-	 * Note that if the SSH_BUG_NOREKEY compatibility flag is set then no
-	 * automatic rekeying is performed nor do we enforce the 3rd rule.
-	 * This means that we can be always forced by the opposite side to never
-	 * initiate automatic key re-exchange. This might change in the future.
-	 *
-	 * The RekeyLimit option keyword may only enforce more frequent key
-	 * renegotiation, never less. For more information on key renegotiation,
-	 * see:
-	 *
-	 * - RFC 4253 (SSH Transport Layer Protocol), section "9. Key
-	 *   Re-Exchange"
-	 * - RFC 4344 (SSH Transport Layer Encryption Modes), sections "3.
-	 *   Rekeying" and "6.1 Rekeying Considerations"
-	 */
-	if (enc->block_size >= 16)
-		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size * 2);
-	else
-		*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
-
-	if (rekey_limit)
-		*max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks, rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
-}
-
-void
-free_keys(Newkeys *keys)
-{
-	Enc *enc;
-	Mac *mac;
-	Comp *comp;
-
-	enc  = &keys->enc;
-	mac  = &keys->mac;
-	comp = &keys->comp;
-	xfree(enc->name);
-	xfree(enc->iv);
-	xfree(enc->key);
-
-	memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
-	xfree(mac->key);
-	xfree(mac->name);
-	mac_clear(mac);
-
-	xfree(comp->name);
-	xfree(keys);
-}
-
-/*
- * Process SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message. If we are using the engine we must have
- * both SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS processed before we can finish the engine, fork, and
- * reinitialize the crypto contexts. We can't fork before processing the 2nd
- * message otherwise we couldn't encrypt/decrypt that message at all - note that
- * parent's PKCS#11 sessions are useless after the fork and we must process
- * both SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS messages using the old keys.
- */
-void
-process_newkeys(int mode)
-{
-	/* this function is for the client only */
-	if (packet_is_server() != 0)
-		return;
-
-	if (will_daemonize == FIRST_NEWKEYS_PROCESSED) {
-		debug3("both SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS processed, will daemonize now");
-		cipher_cleanup(&send_context);
-		cipher_cleanup(&receive_context);
-		pkcs11_engine_finish(e);
-		if (daemon(1, 1) < 0) {
-			fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s",
-			    strerror(errno));
-		}
-		e = pkcs11_engine_load(e != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-
-		set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
-		set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
-		will_daemonize = SECOND_NEWKEYS_PROCESSED;
-		packet_send2();
-	} else {
-		if (will_daemonize == DAEMONIZING_REQUESTED)
-			will_daemonize = FIRST_NEWKEYS_PROCESSED;
-		else
-			set_newkeys(mode);
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
- */
-static void
-packet_send2_wrapped(void)
-{
-	u_char type, *cp, *macbuf = NULL;
-	u_char padlen, pad;
-	u_int packet_length = 0;
-	u_int i, len;
-	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-	Enc *enc   = NULL;
-	Mac *mac   = NULL;
-	Comp *comp = NULL;
-	int block_size;
-
-	if (newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
-		enc  = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
-		mac  = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
-		comp = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
-	}
-	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
-
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
-	type = cp[5];
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-	debug("plain output packet to be processed (%d bytes):\n",
-	    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-	buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet);
-#endif
-
-	if (comp && comp->enabled) {
-		len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
-		/* skip header, compress only payload */
-		buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 5);
-		buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
-		buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer);
-		buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
-		buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5);
-		buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
-		    buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
-		DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %d", len,
-		    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)));
-	}
-
-	/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
-	len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
-
-	/*
-	 * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
-	 * minimum padding is 4 bytes
-	 */
-	padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
-	if (padlen < 4)
-		padlen += block_size;
-	if (extra_pad) {
-		/* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */
-		extra_pad  = roundup(extra_pad, block_size);
-		pad = extra_pad - ((len + padlen) % extra_pad);
-		debug3("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
-		    pad, len, padlen, extra_pad);
-		padlen += pad;
-		extra_pad = 0;
-	}
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&outgoing_packet, padlen);
-	if (enc && !send_context.plaintext) {
-		/* random padding */
-		for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) {
-			if (i % 4 == 0)
-				rnd = arc4random();
-			cp[i] = rnd & 0xff;
-			rnd >>= 8;
-		}
-	} else {
-		/* clear padding */
-		memset(cp, 0, padlen);
-	}
-	/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
-	packet_length = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) - 4;
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
-	PUT_32BIT(cp, packet_length);
-	cp[4] = padlen;
-	DBG(debug("will send %d bytes (includes padlen %d)",
-	    packet_length + 4, padlen));
-
-	/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
-	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
-		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, p_send.seqnr,
-		    buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
-		    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-		DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", p_send.seqnr));
-	}
-	/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-	cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-	/* append unencrypted MAC */
-	if (mac && mac->enabled)
-		buffer_append(&output, (char *)macbuf, mac->mac_len);
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-	debug("encrypted output queue now contains (%d bytes):\n",
-	    buffer_len(&output));
-	buffer_dump(&output);
-#endif
-	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
-	if (++p_send.seqnr == 0)
-		log("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
-
-	/*
-	 * RFC 4344: 3.1. First Rekeying Recommendation
-	 *
-	 * "Because of possible information leakage through the MAC tag after a
-	 * key exchange, .... an SSH implementation SHOULD NOT send more than
-	 * 2**32 packets before rekeying again."
-	 *
-	 * The code below is a hard check so that we are sure we don't go across
-	 * the suggestion. However, since the largest cipher block size we have
-	 * (AES) is 16 bytes we can't reach 2^32 SSH packets encrypted with the
-	 * same key while performing periodic rekeying.
-	 */
-	if (++p_send.packets == 0)
-		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
-			fatal("too many packets encrypted with same key");
-	p_send.blocks += (packet_length + 4) / block_size;
-	buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
-
-	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
-		/*
-		 * set_newkeys(MODE_OUT) in the client. Note that in the
-		 * unprivileged child, set_newkeys() for MODE_OUT are set after
-		 * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS is read from the monitor and forwarded to
-		 * the client side.
-		 */
-		process_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Packets we deal with here are plain until we encrypt them in
- * packet_send2_wrapped().
- *
- * As already mentioned in a comment at process_newkeys() function we must not
- * fork() until both SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packets were processed. Until this is done
- * we must queue all packets so that they can be encrypted with the new keys and
- * then sent to the other side. However, what can happen here is that we get
- * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS after we sent it. In that situation we must call
- * packet_send2() anyway to empty the queue, and set the rekey flag to the
- * finished state. If we didn't do that we would just hang and enqueue data.
- */
-static void
-packet_send2(void)
-{
-	static int rekeying = 0;
-	struct packet *p;
-	u_char type, *cp;
-
-	if (will_daemonize != SECOND_NEWKEYS_PROCESSED) {
-		cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
-		type = cp[5];
-
-		/* during rekeying we can only send key exchange messages */
-		if (rekeying) {
-			if (!((type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN) &&
-			    (type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX))) {
-				debug("enqueue a plain packet because rekex in "
-				    "progress [type %u]", type);
-				p = xmalloc(sizeof(*p));
-				p->type = type;
-				memcpy(&p->payload, &outgoing_packet, sizeof(Buffer));
-				buffer_init(&outgoing_packet);
-				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&outgoing, p, next);
-				return;
-			}
-		}
-
-		/* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
-		if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
-			rekeying = 1;
-
-		packet_send2_wrapped();
-	}
-
-	/* after rekex is done we can process the queue of plain packets */
-	if (will_daemonize == SECOND_NEWKEYS_PROCESSED ||
-	    (will_daemonize == NOT_DAEMONIZING && type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) {
-		rekeying = 0;
-		will_daemonize = NOT_DAEMONIZING;
-		while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&outgoing)) != NULL) {
-			type = p->type;
-			debug("dequeuing a plain packet since rekex is over "
-			    "[type %u]", type);
-			buffer_free(&outgoing_packet);
-			memcpy(&outgoing_packet, &p->payload, sizeof(Buffer));
-			TAILQ_REMOVE(&outgoing, p, next);
-			xfree(p);
-			packet_send2_wrapped();
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-void
-packet_send(void)
-{
-	if (compat20)
-		packet_send2();
-	else
-		packet_send1();
-	DBG(debug("packet_send done"));
-}
-
-/*
- * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type.  Note that
- * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
- * be used during the interactive session.
- *
- * The function is also used in the monitor to read the authentication context
- * in aps_read_auth_context() via packet_read_seqnr(), before the monitor enters
- * aps_monitor_loop() and starts using the process_input() function.
- */
-int
-packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
-{
-	int type, len;
-	fd_set *setp;
-	char buf[8192];
-	DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
-
-	setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS) *
-	    sizeof(fd_mask));
-
-	/* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
-	for (;;) {
-		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
-		type = packet_read_poll_seqnr(seqnr_p);
-		if (!compat20 && (
-		    type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
-		    || type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
-		    || type == SSH_CMSG_EOF
-		    || type == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
-			packet_check_eom();
-		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
-		if (type != SSH_MSG_NONE) {
-			xfree(setp);
-			return type;
-		}
-		/*
-		 * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
-		 * buffer, and try again.
-		 */
-		memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) *
-		    sizeof(fd_mask));
-		FD_SET(connection_in, setp);
-
-		/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
-		while (select(connection_in + 1, setp, NULL, NULL, NULL) == -1 &&
-		    (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
-			;
-
-		/* Read data from the socket. */
-		len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
-		if (len == 0) {
-			if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
-				log("Connection closed by %.200s",
-				    get_remote_ipaddr());
-			else
-				debug("child closed the communication pipe "
-				    "before user auth was finished");
-			fatal_cleanup();
-		}
-		if (len < 0) {
-			if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
-				fatal("Read from socket failed: %.100s",
-				    strerror(errno));
-			else
-				fatal("Read from communication pipe failed: "
-				    "%.100s", strerror(errno));
-		}
-		/* Append it to the buffer. */
-		packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
-	}
-	/* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-int
-packet_read(void)
-{
-	return packet_read_seqnr(NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
- * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
- */
-
-void
-packet_read_expect(int expected_type)
-{
-	int type;
-
-	type = packet_read();
-	if (type != expected_type)
-		packet_disconnect("Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
-		    expected_type, type);
-}
-
-/* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via
- * packet_process_incoming.  If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns
- * SSH_MSG_NONE.  This does not wait for data from the connection.
- *
- * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here.  Also,
- * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned
- * to higher levels.
- */
-
-static int
-packet_read_poll1(void)
-{
-	u_int len, padded_len;
-	u_char *cp, type;
-	u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
-
-	/* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
-	if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + 8)
-		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
-	/* Get length of incoming packet. */
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&input);
-	len = GET_32BIT(cp);
-	if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
-		packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %d.", len);
-	padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
-
-	/* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
-	if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + padded_len)
-		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
-
-	/* The entire packet is in buffer. */
-
-	/* Consume packet length. */
-	buffer_consume(&input, 4);
-
-	/*
-	 * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
-	 * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
-	 * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
-	 */
-	if (!receive_context.plaintext) {
-		switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len, NULL)) {
-		case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
-			packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
-			    "network attack detected");
-			break;
-		case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
-			packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
-			    "service detected");
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
-	buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, padded_len);
-	cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len);
-
-	buffer_consume(&input, padded_len);
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-	debug("read_poll plain/full:\n");
-	buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
-#endif
-
-	/* Compute packet checksum. */
-	checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
-	    buffer_len(&incoming_packet) - 4);
-
-	/* Skip padding. */
-	buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8);
-
-	/* Test check bytes. */
-	if (len != buffer_len(&incoming_packet))
-		packet_disconnect("packet_read_poll1: len %d != buffer_len %d.",
-		    len, buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
-
-	cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + len - 4;
-	stored_checksum = GET_32BIT(cp);
-	if (checksum != stored_checksum)
-		packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input.");
-	buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, 4);
-
-	if (packet_compression) {
-		buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
-		buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer);
-		buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
-		buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
-		    buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
-	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet);
-	return type;
-}
-
-static int
-packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
-{
-	static u_int packet_length = 0;
-	u_int padlen, need;
-	u_char *macbuf, *cp, type;
-	int maclen, block_size;
-	Enc *enc   = NULL;
-	Mac *mac   = NULL;
-	Comp *comp = NULL;
-
-	if (newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
-		enc  = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
-		mac  = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
-		comp = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
-	}
-	maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
-	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
-
-	if (packet_length == 0) {
-		/*
-		 * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
-		 * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
-		 */
-		if (buffer_len(&input) < block_size)
-			return SSH_MSG_NONE;
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-		debug("encrypted data we have in read queue (%d bytes):\n",
-		    buffer_len(&input));
-		buffer_dump(&input);
-#endif
-		buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
-		cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, block_size);
-		cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input),
-		    block_size);
-		cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
-		packet_length = GET_32BIT(cp);
-		if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > 256 * 1024) {
-			packet_disconnect("Bad packet length.");
-		}
-		DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", packet_length + 4));
-		buffer_consume(&input, block_size);
-	}
-	/* we have a partial packet of block_size bytes */
-	need = 4 + packet_length - block_size;
-	DBG(debug("partial packet %d, still need %d, maclen %d", block_size,
-	    need, maclen));
-	if (need % block_size != 0)
-		packet_disconnect("Bad packet length.");
-	/*
-	 * check if the entire packet has been received and
-	 * decrypt into incoming_packet
-	 */
-	if (buffer_len(&input) < need + maclen)
-		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-	debug("in read_poll, the encrypted input queue now contains "
-	    "(%d bytes):\n", buffer_len(&input));
-	buffer_dump(&input);
-#endif
-	cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, need);
-	cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), need);
-	buffer_consume(&input, need);
-	/*
-	 * compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
-	 * increment sequence number for incoming packet
-	 */
-	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
-		macbuf = mac_compute(mac, p_read.seqnr,
-		    buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
-		    buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
-		if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&input), mac->mac_len) != 0)
-			packet_disconnect("Corrupted MAC on input.");
-		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", p_read.seqnr));
-		buffer_consume(&input, mac->mac_len);
-	}
-	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
-		*seqnr_p = p_read.seqnr;
-	if (++p_read.seqnr == 0)
-		log("incoming seqnr wraps around");
-
-	/* see above for the comment on "First Rekeying Recommendation" */
-	if (++p_read.packets == 0)
-		if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
-			fatal("too many packets with same key");
-	p_read.blocks += (packet_length + 4) / block_size;
-
-	/* get padlen */
-	cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
-	padlen = cp[4];
-	DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
-	if (padlen < 4)
-		packet_disconnect("Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen);
-
-	/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
-	buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 4 + 1);
-	buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, padlen);
-
-	DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d", buffer_len(&incoming_packet)));
-	if (comp && comp->enabled) {
-		buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
-		buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer);
-		buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
-		buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
-		    buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
-		DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d",
-		    buffer_len(&incoming_packet)));
-	}
-	/*
-	 * get packet type, implies consume.
-	 * return length of payload (without type field)
-	 */
-	type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet);
-	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
-		/*
-		 * set_newkeys(MODE_IN) in the client because it doesn't have a
-		 * dispatch function for SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS in contrast to the
-		 * server processes. Note that in the unprivileged child,
-		 * set_newkeys() for MODE_IN are set in dispatch function
-		 * altprivsep_rekey() after SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet is received
-		 * from the client.
-		 */
-		process_newkeys(MODE_IN);
-	}
-
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-	debug("decrypted input packet [type %d]:\n", type);
-	buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
-#endif
-	/* reset for next packet */
-	packet_length = 0;
-	return type;
-}
-
-/*
- * This tries to read a packet from the buffer of received data. Note that it
- * doesn't read() anything from the network socket.
- */
-int
-packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
-{
-	u_int reason, seqnr;
-	u_char type;
-	char *msg;
-
-	for (;;) {
-		if (compat20) {
-			type = packet_read_poll2(seqnr_p);
-			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
-			switch (type) {
-			case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
-				break;
-			case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
-				packet_get_char();
-				msg = packet_get_utf8_string(NULL);
-				msg = g11n_filter_string(msg);
-				debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
-				xfree(msg);
-				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-				xfree(msg);
-				break;
-			case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
-				reason = packet_get_int();
-				msg = packet_get_utf8_string(NULL);
-				msg = g11n_filter_string(msg);
-				log("Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s",
-				    get_remote_ipaddr(), reason, msg);
-				xfree(msg);
-				fatal_cleanup();
-				break;
-			case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
-				seqnr = packet_get_int();
-				debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
-				    seqnr);
-				break;
-			default:
-				return type;
-				break;
-			}
-		} else {
-			type = packet_read_poll1();
-			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
-			switch (type) {
-			case SSH_MSG_IGNORE:
-				break;
-			case SSH_MSG_DEBUG:
-				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-				debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
-				xfree(msg);
-				break;
-			case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
-				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-				log("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s",
-				    get_remote_ipaddr(), msg);
-				fatal_cleanup();
-				xfree(msg);
-				break;
-			default:
-				return type;
-				break;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-int
-packet_read_poll(void)
-{
-	return packet_read_poll_seqnr(NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Buffers the given amount of input characters.  This is intended to be used
- * together with packet_read_poll.
- */
-
-void
-packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len)
-{
-	buffer_append(&input, buf, len);
-}
-
-/* Returns a character from the packet. */
-
-u_int
-packet_get_char(void)
-{
-	char ch;
-
-	buffer_get(&incoming_packet, &ch, 1);
-	return (u_char) ch;
-}
-
-/* Returns an integer from the packet data. */
-
-u_int
-packet_get_int(void)
-{
-	return buffer_get_int(&incoming_packet);
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns an arbitrary precision integer from the packet data.  The integer
- * must have been initialized before this call.
- */
-
-void
-packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
-{
-	buffer_get_bignum(&incoming_packet, value);
-}
-
-void
-packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
-{
-	buffer_get_bignum2(&incoming_packet, value);
-}
-
-void *
-packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr)
-{
-	u_int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
-
-	if (length_ptr != NULL)
-		*length_ptr = bytes;
-	return buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
-}
-
-int
-packet_remaining(void)
-{
-	return buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns a string from the packet data.  The string is allocated using
- * xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling program to free it when
- * no longer needed.  The length_ptr argument may be NULL, or point to an
- * integer into which the length of the string is stored.
- */
-
-void *
-packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr)
-{
-	return buffer_get_string(&incoming_packet, length_ptr);
-}
-
-char *
-packet_get_utf8_string(uint_t *length_ptr)
-{
-	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_STRING_ENCODING)
-		return (buffer_get_string(&incoming_packet, length_ptr));
-	else
-		return (buffer_get_utf8_string(&incoming_packet, length_ptr));
-}
-
-/*
- * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client.  This message
- * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
- * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
- * in verbose mode.  These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
- * authentication problems.   The length of the formatted message must not
- * exceed 1024 bytes.  This will automatically call packet_write_wait.
- */
-
-void
-packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...)
-{
-	char buf[1024];
-	va_list args;
-
-	if (compat20 && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
-		return;
-
-	va_start(args, fmt);
-	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), gettext(fmt), args);
-	va_end(args);
-
-#ifdef ALTPRIVSEP
-	/* shouldn't happen */
-	if (packet_monitor) {
-		debug("packet_send_debug: %s", buf);
-		return;
-	}
-#endif /* ALTPRIVSEP */
-
-	if (compat20) {
-		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
-		packet_put_char(0);	/* bool: always display */
-		packet_put_utf8_cstring(buf);
-		packet_put_cstring("");
-	} else {
-		packet_start(SSH_MSG_DEBUG);
-		packet_put_cstring(buf);
-	}
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-}
-
-/*
- * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
- * connection, and exits.  This function never returns. The error message
- * should not contain a newline.  The length of the formatted message must
- * not exceed 1024 bytes.
- */
-
-void
-packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...)
-{
-	char buf[1024];
-	va_list args;
-	static int disconnecting = 0;
-
-	if (disconnecting)	/* Guard against recursive invocations. */
-		fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
-	disconnecting = 1;
-
-	/*
-	 * Format the message.  Note that the caller must make sure the
-	 * message is of limited size.
-	 */
-	va_start(args, fmt);
-	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
-	va_end(args);
-
-#ifdef ALTPRIVSEP
-	/*
-	 * If we packet_disconnect() in the monitor the fatal cleanups will take
-	 * care of the child.  See main() in sshd.c.  We don't send the packet
-	 * disconnect message here because: a) the child might not be looking
-	 * for it and b) because we don't really know if the child is compat20
-	 * or not as we lost that information when packet_set_monitor() was
-	 * called.
-	 */
-	if (packet_monitor)
-		goto close_stuff;
-#endif /* ALTPRIVSEP */
-
-	/* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait for it to get sent. */
-	if (compat20) {
-		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
-		packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
-		packet_put_utf8_cstring(buf);
-		packet_put_cstring("");
-	} else {
-		packet_start(SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT);
-		packet_put_cstring(buf);
-	}
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-#ifdef ALTPRIVSEP
-close_stuff:
-#endif /* ALTPRIVSEP */
-	/* Stop listening for connections. */
-	channel_close_all();
-
-	/* Close the connection. */
-	packet_close();
-
-	/* Display the error locally and exit. */
-	log("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
-	fatal_cleanup();
-}
-
-/* Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of the output. */
-
-void
-packet_write_poll(void)
-{
-	int len = buffer_len(&output);
-
-	if (len > 0) {
-		len = write(connection_out, buffer_ptr(&output), len);
-		if (len <= 0) {
-			if (errno == EAGAIN)
-				return;
-			else
-				fatal("Write failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-		}
-#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
-		debug("in packet_write_poll, %d bytes just sent to the "
-		    "remote side", len);
-#endif
-		buffer_consume(&output, len);
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
- * written.
- */
-
-void
-packet_write_wait(void)
-{
-	fd_set *setp;
-
-	setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
-	    sizeof(fd_mask));
-	packet_write_poll();
-	while (packet_have_data_to_write()) {
-		memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
-		    sizeof(fd_mask));
-		FD_SET(connection_out, setp);
-		while (select(connection_out + 1, NULL, setp, NULL, NULL) == -1 &&
-		    (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
-			;
-		packet_write_poll();
-	}
-	xfree(setp);
-}
-
-/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
-
-int
-packet_have_data_to_write(void)
-{
-	return buffer_len(&output) != 0;
-}
-
-/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
-
-int
-packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void)
-{
-	if (interactive_mode)
-		return buffer_len(&output) < 16384;
-	else
-		return buffer_len(&output) < 128 * 1024;
-}
-
-/* Informs that the current session is interactive.  Sets IP flags for that. */
-
-void
-packet_set_interactive(int interactive)
-{
-	static int called = 0;
-#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
-	int lowdelay = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
-	int throughput = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
-#endif
-
-	if (called)
-		return;
-	called = 1;
-
-	/* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
-	interactive_mode = interactive;
-
-	/* Only set socket options if using a socket.  */
-	if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
-		return;
-	/*
-	 * IPTOS_LOWDELAY and IPTOS_THROUGHPUT are IPv4 only
-	 */
-	if (interactive) {
-		/*
-		 * Set IP options for an interactive connection.  Use
-		 * IPTOS_LOWDELAY and TCP_NODELAY.
-		 */
-#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
-		if (packet_connection_is_ipv4()) {
-			if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
-			    &lowdelay, sizeof(lowdelay)) < 0)
-				error("setsockopt IPTOS_LOWDELAY: %.100s",
-				    strerror(errno));
-		}
-#endif
-		set_nodelay(connection_in);
-	}
-#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
-	else if (packet_connection_is_ipv4()) {
-		/*
-		 * Set IP options for a non-interactive connection.  Use
-		 * IPTOS_THROUGHPUT.
-		 */
-		if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &throughput,
-		    sizeof(throughput)) < 0)
-			error("setsockopt IPTOS_THROUGHPUT: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-	}
-#endif
-}
-
-/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
-
-int
-packet_is_interactive(void)
-{
-	return interactive_mode;
-}
-
-int
-packet_set_maxsize(int s)
-{
-	static int called = 0;
-
-	if (called) {
-		log("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
-		    max_packet_size, s);
-		return -1;
-	}
-	if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
-		log("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
-		return -1;
-	}
-	called = 1;
-	debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
-	max_packet_size = s;
-	return s;
-}
-
-/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
-void
-packet_add_padding(u_char pad)
-{
-	extra_pad = pad;
-}
-
-/*
- * 9.2.  Ignored Data Message
- *
- *   byte      SSH_MSG_IGNORE
- *   string    data
- *
- * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
- * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
- * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
- * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
- */
-void
-packet_send_ignore(int nbytes)
-{
-	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-	int i;
-
-#ifdef ALTPRIVSEP
-	/* shouldn't happen -- see packet_set_monitor() */
-	if (packet_monitor)
-		return;
-#endif /* ALTPRIVSEP */
-
-	packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE);
-	packet_put_int(nbytes);
-	for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
-		if (i % 4 == 0)
-			rnd = arc4random();
-		packet_put_char((u_char)rnd & 0xff);
-		rnd >>= 8;
-	}
-}
-
-#define MAX_PACKETS	(1U<<31)
-int
-packet_need_rekeying(void)
-{
-	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
-		return 0;
-	return
-	    (p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
-	    (p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
-	    (max_blocks_out && (p_send.blocks > max_blocks_out)) ||
-	    (max_blocks_in  && (p_read.blocks > max_blocks_in));
-}
-
-void
-packet_set_rekey_limit(u_int32_t bytes)
-{
-	rekey_limit = bytes;
-}
-
-#ifdef ALTPRIVSEP
-void
-packet_set_server(void)
-{
-	packet_server = 1;
-}
-
-int
-packet_is_server(void)
-{
-	return (packet_server);
-}
-
-void
-packet_set_monitor(int pipe)
-{
-	int dup_fd;
-
-	packet_server = 1;
-	packet_monitor = 1;
-
-	/*
-	 * Awful hack follows.
-	 *
-	 * For SSHv1 the monitor does not process any SSHv1 packets, only
-	 * ALTPRIVSEP packets.  We take advantage of that here to keep changes
-	 * to packet.c to a minimum by using the SSHv2 binary packet protocol,
-	 * with cipher "none," mac "none" and compression alg "none," as the
-	 * basis for the monitor protocol.  And so to force packet.c to treat
-	 * packets as SSHv2 we force compat20 == 1 here.
-	 *
-	 * For completeness and to help future developers catch this we also
-	 * force compat20 == 1 in the monitor loop, in serverloop.c.
-	 */
-	compat20 = 1;
-
-	/*
-	 * NOTE:  Assumptions below!
-	 *
-	 *  - lots of packet.c code assumes that (connection_in ==
-	 *  connection_out) -> connection is socket
-	 *
-	 *  - packet_close() does not shutdown() the connection fildes
-	 *  if connection_in != connection_out
-	 *
-	 *  - other code assumes the connection is a socket if
-	 *  connection_in == connection_out
-	 */
-
-	if ((dup_fd = dup(pipe)) < 0)
-		fatal("Monitor failed to start: %s", strerror(errno));
-
-	/*
-	 * make sure that the monitor's child's socket is not shutdown(3SOCKET)
-	 * when we packet_close(). Setting connection_out to -1 will take care
-	 * of that.
-	 */
-	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
-		connection_out = -1;
-
-	/*
-	 * Now clean up the state related to the server socket. As a side
-	 * effect, we also clean up existing cipher contexts that were
-	 * initialized with 'none' cipher in packet_set_connection(). That
-	 * function was called in the child server process shortly after the
-	 * master SSH process forked. However, all of that is reinialized again
-	 * by another packet_set_connection() call right below.
-	 */
-	packet_close();
-
-	/*
-	 * Now make the monitor pipe look like the ssh connection which means
-	 * that connection_in and connection_out will be set to the
-	 * communication pipe descriptors.
-	 */
-	packet_set_connection(pipe, dup_fd);
-}
-
-/*
- * We temporarily need to set connection_in and connection_out descriptors so
- * that we can make use of existing code that gets the IP address and hostname
- * of the peer to write a login/logout record. It's not nice but we would have
- * to change more code when implementing the PKCS#11 engine support.
- */
-void
-packet_set_fds(int fd, int restore)
-{
-	static int stored_fd;
-
-	if (stored_fd == 0 && restore == 0) {
-		debug3("packet_set_fds: saving %d, installing %d",
-		    connection_in, fd);
-		stored_fd = connection_in;
-		/* we don't have a socket in inetd mode */
-		if (fd != -1)
-			connection_in = connection_out = fd;
-		return;
-	}
-
-	if (restore == 1) {
-		debug3("restoring %d to connection_in/out", stored_fd);
-		connection_in = connection_out = stored_fd;
-	}
-}
-
-int
-packet_is_monitor(void)
-{
-	return (packet_monitor);
-}
-#endif /* ALTPRIVSEP */
